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Telepresence and the role of the senses 
 
Abstract The telepresence experience can be evoked in a number of ways. A well-known 
example is a player of videogames who reports about a telepresence experience, a subjective 
experience of being in one place or environment, even when physically situated in another 
place. In this paper we set the phenomenon of telepresence into a theoretical framework. As 
people react subjectively to stimuli from telepresence, empirical studies can give more 
evidence about the phenomenon. Thus, our contribution is to bridge the theoretical with the 
empirical. We discuss theories of perception with an emphasis on Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty 
and Gibson, the role of the senses and the Spinozian belief procedure. The aim is to contribute 
to our understanding of this phenomenon. A telepresence-study that included the affordance 
concept is used to empirically study how players report sense-reactions to virtual sightseeing 
in two cities. We investigate and explore the interplay of the philosophical and the empirical. 
The findings indicate that it is not only the visual sense that plays a role in this experience, 
but all senses.  
1 Introduction 
The aim of this paper is to discuss the theoretical basis for the telepresence 
phenomenon. We perform empirical research that takes into account the role of the 
senses. Both theoretical work and empirical evidence are of importance for our 
understanding of this phenomenon. 
 
According to Don Ihde (1983:10), technology is a basis for an understanding both of 
the world and of ourselves. Technology is a broad term that refers to artifacts created 
by humans, such as machines, devices and components, and the methods used to 
create these artifacts. Telepresence is the feeling of being in a place or environment 
while not being physically in this environment. Telepresence can be described as a 
subjective experience evoked by media technology. Questions that can be asked are; 
why does it happen, can we identify relevant theories or theoretical contributions that 
we can use to discuss, analyze, and deepen our understanding of this phenomenon. 
Computer graphics and realistic rendering technologies play a key role in evoking 
telepresence. These technologies blur the lines between fiction and non-fiction. 
Although many developers in ICT are not very concerned with the theoretical 
questions, the developers seem to have a kind of understanding and feeling for how 
users respond to what they make. Today video games represent a major form of 
entertainment. As the technology has improved over the years, these games show 
situations and characters that are realistic and, for lack of a better term, very life-like.  
 
von Helmholtz introduced the notion that visual perceptions are unconscious 
inferences, a reflex-like mechanism which is part of the formation of visual 
impressions. For our understanding of the phenomenon the work by von Helmholtz 
(1866) can be a starting point. To von Helmholtz, human perception was but 
indirectly related to objects, being inferred from fragmentary and often hardly 
relevant data signaled by the eyes. The judgment we make operates as if we were 
making rational inferences from sensory information – through our eyes, we 
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necessarily perceive things as real. von Helmholtz’s ideas, the type of inferences he 
describes, and the role of the visual sense seem relevant for telepresence.  
 
The role of visual technologies in evoking the telepresence experience has been 
documented many times – there is empirical evidence for the phenomenon. 
Telepresence is a visual experience, and often more than that. Therefore, we will 
discuss telepresence as a perceptual experience and ask about the role of the senses 
and sense-reactions. Based on insights from the empirical work, we seek contribute to 
our understanding of the phenomenon, and to discuss the interplay between theory 
and empirical observations. 
 
In the telepresence community, some researchers highlight the role of activities. Mel 
Slater (2009b) asks: Is telepresence better referred to as correlational presence that 
emphasizes the correlation between activity and sensory feedback? Furthermore, to 
study the phenomenon in the empirical domain of the human-technology relationship, 
the question is how to design a study that takes into account sense-reactions.  
 
Some players of videogames report that their virtual experience is a veridical 
experience and appears similar to an experience without media technology. The 
telepresence researchers Lombard and Weinstein (2012: 6) give an example: they 
write; one of the players in the study says: 
 
 I completely felt that I was a part of the world and the characters and settings 
were all real and places I have been.  
 
In this context, the experience is not only described as a veridical experience, but as 
an actual visit to a place. Schwartz (2006: 315) has a similar observation. He quotes a 
player of the video game Grand Theft Auto who says: 
 
 You feel as if you’re in a real town/city with other people.  
 
In this paper, we explore theories of relevance for the telepresence phenomenon. We 
ask specifically about the role of the senses. If we assume that we can study 
telepresence in a similar manner as experiences that we have face-to-face in a non-
digital environment, it seems relevant to explore the role of all senses rather than 
focusing mainly on the visual sense. For empirical research, the question is also how 
to measure the telepresence-experience. In this paper, findings from two empirical 
studies with video-games are used to discuss this question. Furthermore, based on a 
literature review, we discuss the concepts affordance and correlation presence, and 
align these with Merleau-Ponty’s theory of perception. Finally, for the question why 
is telepresence perceived as a veridical experience, we draw attention to the Spinozian 
belief procedure, the notion that a percept is immediately believed. In decision theory 
this is referred to as the dual-process theories of reasoning. We are interested in the 
interplay between the theoretical and the empirical, and we believe this is an example 
of a research field where philosophy and empirical science can interact. We conclude 
the paper with remarks about the approaches that can be taken in future research on 
the telepresence phenomenon. 
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2 Perceptual realism and the common sense of the ordinary man 
Perceptual realism is the view that, in ordinary perception, one is directly aware of 
physical objects and events—things that exist independently of our perception of 
them. Most people are perceptual realists. This observation is shared by 
representationalists (Dretske, 2003) as well as relationalists (Martin, 2004). In 
everyday life we take the phenomenal world to be the physical world, and we treat the 
objects and events we perceive as if they were the objects and events themselves 
(Velmans, 2000). Another term for this is commonsensical realism, or just common 
sense of the ordinary man (Putnam, 1994). 
 
People experience telepresence. A discussion of the telepresence experience as a 
technology-mediated experience should, therefore, include this perspective. When 
ordinary people are asked in an empirical study, they express their subjective feelings, 
their opinions based on their experiences. Although some might have a theoretical 
knowledge of relevance for the subject matter, it is unlikely that this is influencing 
how they answer questions in a survey. If I am asked whether I am having the 
experience of being there, the answer can be yes or no, or maybe “yes, for a moment I 
had this telepresence experience”. We can describe this as a first person introspective 
judgment or report. In telepresence research there are many studies from this 
perspective. Many studies, particularly studies with players of games and users of VR, 
seem to be more concerned with the subjective, how the players describe the 
experience, than the theoretical questions and theoretical contributions from other 
fields such as philosophy. What follows in this section is a brief review of 
telepresence definitions, Heidegger’s and Merleau-Ponty’s theory of perception, and 
Gibson’s affordance concept. 
3 Telepresence 
Telepresence is a relatively new research field. The first journal on telepresence was 
inaugurated in 1992. However, since the mid-1950s, researchers have increasingly 
studied the telepresence phenomenon. In the 1950s the first modern VR-devices, such 
as the Sensorama and a number of 3D films were produced. In an article in Esprit, 
André Bazin (1967) entitles one section as The Concept of Presence, where he defines 
the term with regard to time and space. Bazin (1967: 96) writes: 
 	
Presence naturally, is defined in terms of time and space. "To be in the 
presence of someone" is to recognize him as existing contemporaneously 
with us and to note that he comes within the actual range of our senses (our 
emphasis)  
 
In the 1990s, a number of research papers were published in the telepresence journal, 
at conferences, and a telepresence research community was established.  
 
The word telepresence has two parts. “Tele” refers to the Greek term at a distance or 
far away and is used in tele-operation and telecommunication to emphasis the remote 
aspect while presence refers to the here and now. Witmer and Singer (1998) define 
telepresence as the subjective experience of being in one place or environment, even 
when one is physically situated in another place. We can refer to this as telepresence 
as transportation. Steuer (1992:75), the author of an influential paper on telepresence, 
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writes that: 
 
when perception is mediated by a communication technology, one is forced to 
perceive two separate environments simultaneously: the physical environment 
in which one is actually present, and the environment presented via the 
medium. The term telepresence can be used to describe the precedence of the 
latter experience in favor of the former; that is, telepresence is the extent to 
which one feels present in the mediated environment, rather than in the 
immediate physical environment.  
 
To summarize, the attention is on the mediated environment, and the mediated 
environment takes precedence over the environment in which one is physically 
present. 
 
Lombard and Ditton (1997) define telepresence as the perceptual illusion of non-
mediation. This definition is one of the most frequently cited definitions in 
telepresence research. Lombard, Ditton and their colleagues, have also developed a 
methodology for telepresence measurement. This measurement has a sub-construct 
named perceptual realism concerning the five senses.  
3.1	Telepresence	and	the	Senses	
Aristotle, in de Anima, writes that there are five senses. To Aristotle, vision is the 
primary human sense to which the others are subordinate. In the Aristotelian 
hierarchy of the senses, the visual sense is therefore the dominant sense (Burri, et al. 
2011). Also today it is common to distinguish between sight, hearing, touch, taste, 
and smell, the five senses (Nudd_, 2004). According to Fulkerson (2014) it is unlikely 
that we will find unified criteria for defining each of the senses. Moreover, the senses 
seem to be internally linked, and sometimes co-dependent. Gibson (1966) emphasized 
that the senses are a perceptional system. Furthermore, we can distinguish between 
the exteroceptive senses (such as sight and hearing) that detect objects, and properties 
in the external world to the body, and the interoceptive senses, which detect changes 
to the body (MacPherson, 2011).  
 
Telepresence can be characterized as technologically-mediated experiences, and as a 
medium-induced experience. The screen and the visual sense play a key role because 
visual media have the ability to convey non-visual aspects of perception (Merchant 
2011). MacDougall (1997) suggests that the visual representation can offer pathways 
to the other senses. Some researchers in telepresence argue that the more the senses 
are stimulated, the higher the degree of presence (Sadowski, 1999). When a person is 
experiencing a mediated or virtual reality environment as if the experience were non-
mediated, the person is experiencing telepresence.  
 
Some commentators maintain that telepresence can be evoked by imagining another 
place as well as by directly perceiving and acting in a mediated version of that place 
(the so-called “book problem” (Biocca 1997, Schubert, 2002). Waterworth et al. 
(2015, p.36) write that;  
the most relevant schism in views of presence is between those theorists who 
suggest that presence is evoked both by internal imagery and perceptions, and 
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those theorists (including ourselves) who suggest that presence is evoked only 
in the latter case. 
 
Waterworth et al. (2015) see the feeling of presence in a technologically-
realized place as an absorption state based around perceptual flow, essentially an 
equivalent experience to feeling present in the place in which the body is physically 
located. They suggest that imagined events and situations may also result in 
absorption, as in a vivid fantasy or daydream. But, people do not normally confuse 
what 1 they conceive in imagination with what they perceive as the external world. 
They suggest that these are qualitatively different experiences with the sense of 
presence underlying an organism’s ability to make this essential distinction. This view 
is compatible with the way people react bodily and perceptually as if they were 
physically located in a distant place, to a greater or lesser extent. 
 
The telepresence literature presents references to theories and philosophical 
discussion that might help us understand the phenomenon. Two of the most influential 
telepresence researchers are Frank Biocca and Mel Slater, and both are concerned 
with such theoretical questions. For instance, Biocca suggests that presence is a sub-
problem of the science of consciousness, specifically the mind-body problem. To him, 
virtual environments potentially alter the interaction of the senses and motor systems 
with energy arrays that represent invariants of the environment such as objects, 
spaces, and other beings (Biocca, 2001: 555).  
 
The definition by Slater (1999) includes the following three factors: Telepresence is 
a) the sense of being there in the virtual environment; b) the extent to which the 
virtual environment becomes the dominant one, i.e., that participants respond to 
events in the virtual rather than the actual environment; and c) the extent to which 
participants remember having visited the place depicted in the virtual environment 
rather than having seen computer-generated images of it. The feeling of presence 
occurs when there is a successful combination of real sensory data and virtually 
generated sensory data or in the case of virtual reality, replacement of real sensory 
data (Slater, 2009b). He argues that humans have a propensity to find correlations 
between their activity and internal state and their sense perceptions [our emphasis] of 
what is going on “out there.” Slater (2009a) is influenced by enactivism, and what is 
referred to as the sensorimotor approach (O’Regan and Noë, 2001).  
4 Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty and Gibson 
According to Merleau-Ponty, the individual's experience rests upon the body (Low, 
2009). We will highlight some of Merleau-Ponty’s core ideas in his theory of 
perception. In this context we also refer to Martin Heidegger’s ready-ready-to hand 
concept. Merleau-Ponty does not explicitly mention Heidegger in his writings, but he 
has a reference to the notion Dasein (Matthews, 2002: 5). Heidegger represents 
classic phenomenology. In Being and Time the scope is broad and goes far beyond 
technology. In The Question Concerning Technology (1954) he analyses the 
relationship with technology and modern science. He discusses technology as a means 
to an end and as an instrumental understanding of technology.  
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Techne refers to the techniques and activities that bring forth a work (poiesis), but it 
includes art as a process of creating. Techne is a mode of revealing. To Heidegger 
everyday activities are the starting-point and the world is at hand [our emphasis] in an 
almost-literal sense. We have a primary and pragmatic interaction with things, “ 
technology is a way of revealing” (Heidegger, 1954). The ready to hand mode is the 
mode of direct practical engagement in which we actually do much of our everyday 
living. For the relationships between Heidegger’s concepts, see Figure 1.  
 
Merleau-Ponty (1962:94-95) places the body at the center of his ontology. He writes:  
I am conscious of the world through the medium of my body [our emphasis]. It is 
from the body that I perceive the world. Merleau-Ponty does not explicitly mention 
Heidegger in his writings, but he has a reference to the notion Dasein (Matthews, 
2002: 5). 
 
 
Fig.1 Heidegger and Dasein 
 
 
Merleau-Ponty argues that perception and action are linked. His research has 
influenced scholars in phenomenology and contemporary philosophy, but very few 
have used his theory and concepts as a foundation for studying experiences in virtual 
environments. We have only identified two researchers that refer to and discuss his 
work, Tripahti (2005) and Morie (2007). Tripathi argues that we are never 
disembodied, not in cyberspace, not in front of a computer because we should focus 
on the act of experience rather on the thing being experienced. Morie (2007) 
emphasizes that Merleau-Ponty has paved the way for a discourse about immersive 
Present	at	hand	(Vorhandenheit)	
“The	adjec*ve	“vorhanden”	means	literally	“before	the	hand”,	but	this	signiﬁca*on	has	long	since	
given	way	to	others.	In	ordinary	German	usage	it	may,	for	instance,	be	applied	to	the	stock	of	goods	
which	a	dealer	has	“on	hand”,	or	to	the	“extant”	works	of	an	author	…”	(Heidegger,	1962,	p.48).	“…	
that	simple	awareness	of	something	present-at-hand	in	its	sheer	presence-at-hand,	which	Parmenides	
had	already	taken	to	guide	him	in	his	own	interpreta*on	of	Being	-	has	the	Temporal	structure	of	a	
pure	“making-present”	of	“something”	(Heidegger,	1962,	p.48).	
	
Two	types:	reﬂec*on	and	object	of	theory		
Dasein	(Being	–	there)	
“These	en**es	[Others]	are	neither	present-at-hand	nor	ready-to-hand;	on	the	contrary,	they	are	like	the	very	
Dasein	which	frees	them,	in	that	they	are	there	too,	and	there	with	it”	(Heidegger,	1962,	p.154)		
Unready	to	hand	(Unzuhandenheit)	
When	its	unusability	is	thus	discovered,	
equipment	becomes	conspicuous.	This	
conspicuousness	presents	the	ready-to-
hand	equipment	as	in	a	certain	un-
readiness-to	hand	(Heidegger,	1962,	pp.
102-103).	
		
“When	we	no*ce	what	is	un-ready-to-
hand,	that	which	is	ready-to-hand	enters	
the	mode	of	obtrusiveness”	(Heidegger,	
1962,	p.103).		
Ready	to	hand	(Zuhandenheit)	
Equipment	is	essen*ally	“something	in-order-
to	.	.	.”	[‘etwas	um-zu.	.	.’].	A	totality	of	
equipment	is	cons*tuted	by	various	ways	of	the	
“in-order-to”,	such	as	serviceability,	
conduciveness,	usability,	
manipulability”	(Heidegger,	1962,	p.97)	
		
“Only	because	equipment	has	this	“Being-in-
itself”	and	does	not	merely	occur,	is	it	
manipulable	in	the	broadest	sense	and	at	our	
disposal”	(Heidegger,	1962,	p.98)	
		
Semi-transparent	to	transparent	in	use	
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environments. She refers to Merleau-Ponty’s book The Visible and the Invisible. 
Morie (2007: 107) applies Merleau-Ponty’s ideas and concepts to VR and writes: 
 
 virtual environments are not purely imaginal; we experience them through 
our bodily senses, and in this way they are also real in the sense of the lived 
world.  
 
To Merleau-Ponty, things and worlds of our imagination are variations of the actual 
world. In Visible and Invisible, he states (ibid: 112): 
 
it is the possible worlds and possible things that are variants and doubles of 
the actual world and of actual beings.  
 
Merleau-Ponty emphasizes that the most immediate and essential aspects of the lived 
dimension of space are sensory experiences. In his main work The Phenomenology of 
Perception (ibid: 239) he states:  
 
by thus remaking contact with the body and with the world we shall rediscover 
our self, since, perceiving as we do with our body, the body is a natural self 
and, as it were, the subject of perception.  
 
The senses and perception are interrelated, and the experiences we have with our 
body have a meaning aspect. It is our body that actually absorbs meaning, in the form 
of bodily experience (ibid: 146-147). The body is both the generating and enduring 
aspect of experience, he writes; “Our body is not primarily in space, it is of it.” (ibid: 
148), and existence is spatial (ibid: 342). Human subjectivity is essentially an 
embodied phenomenon, and there is a circular interplay between the three; body-
mind-world. For instance, we have learned from our experience how to find our way 
around in a city. Merleau-Ponty calls this a feedback loop. Merleau-Ponty (ibid: 136) 
writes:  
Cognitive life, the life of desire or perceptual life – is subtended by an 
intentional arc which projects round about us our past, our future, [and]our 
human setting.  
 
This intentional arc “brings about the unity of the senses” (ibid: 136). Merleau-Ponty 
explains how technology is part of the embodied experience, or how technology can 
be an extension of the body. His example is a blind man’s use of a cane. The blind 
man perceives the world through his cane. This is a skill that has to be learned and a 
way of actively probing his environment. When he walks down the street, he is not 
primarily aware of the cane, instead he is aware of the curb etc. Like all other 
perception, it is an active communion with the world. The person’s experience is 
created in a bodily encounter and in the reflection of this encounter. In the context of 
telepresence and mediated experiences, the screen and the game-console is the cane. 
The device becomes part of the here-body experience to use a term by Ihde (2002).  
 
For a discussion of Merleau-Ponty and telepresence, there is another metaphor that 
should be mentioned. It is the mirror. Merleau-Ponty (1968) refers to Paul Schilder, 
an Austrian psychoanalyst and the function of a mirror. Merleau-Ponty uses the 
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example of man with a pipe standing in front of a mirror. The mirror externalizes or 
extends my body, my here, in the world over there (Merleau-Ponty 1964: 129–30): 
 
The mirror’s phantom draws my flesh into the outer world (traîne dehors ma 
chair), and at the same time the invisible of my body can invest its psychic 
energy in the other bodies I see.  
 
Schilder (1935: 224) writes:  
 
The experience of the sensation in the mirror is as immediate and original as 
the experience in the real hand. 
 
Some researchers in telepresence discuss the phenomenon from a theoretical point of 
view, but Merleau-Ponty is rarely cited. There can be many reasons why very few 
researchers have adopted Merleau-Ponty’s theory of perception and the role of the 
body in studies of telepresence and presence-evoking technologies. This might 
indicate that insights from phenomenology and philosophy are not appreciated or 
understood in a field dominated by computer scientists. In our view, Merleau-Ponty’s 
theory, his concepts and ideas, seem to be relevant not only for a theoretical 
understanding of the phenomenon, but for empirical work in the field of telepresence, 
in particular, for the choice of measurement in studies that concerns the subjective 
experience, that is when and why players report this feeling of being there. 	
Affordance and correlational presence.  
The perceptual psychologist James J. Gibson introduced the term affordance in his 
book The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception (1979). Since then, the 
affordance concept has been used in a number of disciplines other than psychology. 
According to Gibson (1979), an affordance is neither an objective property nor a 
subjective property. It is both a fact of the environment and a fact of behavior. He 
argues that we perceive objects as having properties of what we ought to do with 
them, and he attributes full normativity to affordances. Not all agree to this strong 
claim. Nanay (2010), for instance, holds the view that when we perceive objects, the 
property affords action sometimes but not always. 
 
According to Slater (2009b), the feeling of presence occurs when there is a successful 
combination of real sensory data and virtually generated sensory data. Slater (2009a) 
treats (tele)presence as rooted in activity, the response of people to their surroundings 
and their ability to actively modify those surroundings (Flach & Holden, 1998; 
Zahorik & Jenison, 1998). Slater (2009b) argues that presence does not demand high 
fidelity to physical reality, but rather that people do respond, and be able to respond, 
as if the sensory data were physically real, and Slater (2009b: 198) suggests that: 
 
humans have a propensity to find correlations between their activity and 
internal state and their sense perceptions of what is going on out there.  
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5 The Spinozian Belief Procedure 
In his book Ethics, Spinoza put forward the notion that a comprehended proposition is 
automatically believed. This means that in the moment, we automatically accept 
information before being able to reject it. The proposition 49 reads (Spinoza, 1677, 
1982):  
 
There is in the mind no volition or affirmation and negation, save that which 
an idea, in as much as it is an idea, involves.  
 
Spinoza suggested that people believe every assertion they understand, but quickly 
un-believe those assertions that are found to be at odds with other established facts 
(Gilbert, 1991). Spinoza argued that to comprehend a proposition, a person implicitly 
accepts the proposition; only later, if the person realizes that the proposition is in 
conflicted with some other, he or she might change his or her mind (ebd.). Richter et 
al. (2009) refers to the notion of an initial acceptance of information as the dual-stage 
model of comprehension and validation. Stanovich (1999, Stanovich and West 2000) 
labeled two types of cognitive processes, system 1 and system 2. In decision science, 
this is a concept often used to explain different decisions processes. There are 
similarities with this theory and the Spinozian belief procedure. System 1 regards 
intuitions that can be described as thoughts and preferences that come to mind quickly 
and without much reflection (Kahneman, 2002). Some formulate this belief procedure 
as a strong claim. Gerard (1997) writes: 
  
perception is quintessentially Spinozian; a percept is immediately believed. 
Only in the case of rare illusions are our senses tricked into believing what is 
not there or in to not believing what is there.  
 
However, there are studies that indicate that this claim is too strong, and in some 
cases not an initial accept (Street and Richardson, 2015). Merleau-Ponty refers to 
Spinoza when he discusses attention, judgement and perception, but not the Spinozian 
belief procedure. 
 
Against this backdrop, we ask whether there are indications that the Spinozian belief 
procedure can inform our understanding of why telepresence occurs from an 
empirical point of view? The experience in the virtual environment can evoke what 
we name the telepresence experience, the feeling of being there. Telepresence is also 
referred to as a medium-induced experience (Steuer, 1992). In the next section we 
present a study with video-games where the experience of a place in a VE is created.  
6 Two Empirical studies with video-games  
The telepresence experience can be evoked in many ways. Schwartz (2006) argues 
that realism and attention to detail allow gamers to experience the game spaces as 
real. One of the areas in which we have seen significant technological advancement 
the recent years is computer graphics and computer-generated imagery. This 
technology seems to blur the line between fiction and non-fiction, and it plays a key 
role in both movies and video games. A trend in this industry is photo-realism (Leister 
et al 1991). It is possible to mimic not only how humans look, but also how they 
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behave. An example is Kara (Robinson, 2012), an avatar made by the video game 
developer David Cage for Playstation.  
 
The geographer Edward Relph writes that virtual places can be more or less accurate 
reproductions of real places and more or less convincing on their own terms (Relph, 
2007). In his theory, Relph (1976) proposes vicarious sense of place, a type of 
transportation to a place through imagination. Relph (2007, 1976) writes: 
  
I have limited knowledge of digital virtual reality. […]Nevertheless, it seems 
to me that mutual interaction is at work between what might be called “real” 
place and virtual places.  
  
It is possible to visit a place in a second hand view or vicarious way that is 
without actually visiting them.   
 
Some researchers distinguish between fantasy or imaginary places and actual places, 
also referred to as remote places. This is evident in the early telepresence literature. 
Held and Durlach (1992), Sheridan (1992), and Steuer (1992) refer to one type of the 
telepresence experience as telepresence in remote places.  
6.1	Telepresence	in	remote	places;	Las	Vegas	and	Los	Angeles	as	virtual	
places	
In many console and videogames, well-known cities are used as an urban 
environment and an integrated part of the narrative. In some games it is possible to 
explore these cities as a tourist in what is referred to as a tourist mode option. For the 
purpose of exploring to what extent a sightseeing experience in a virtual place evoke 
reactions to the senses, we chose two cities that are used in videogames: 1) Las Vegas 
in Project Gotham Racing 4 made by Bizarre Creations for Xbox, 2) Los Angeles in 
Midnight Club Los Angeles made by Rockstar for Playstation. In Table 1, we present 
the profile of the participants. The data-collection took place at three locations; a) 
Temple University in the US, b) Erasmus University in the Netherland and c) 
University of Oslo in Norway. The participants had their origins in the USA, the 
Netherlands, Norway, and some other European countries.  
 
Table 1 – The profile of the participants 
 Las Vegas Los Angeles 
The nationalities of 
the participants: 
From the US From the 
Netherlands 
From Norway and 
other European 
countries 
 
Age  
19–24 years old 
25–29 years old 
30 years or older 
 
91% (43) 
4% (2) 
4% (2) 
 
41% (9) 
32% (7) 
27% (6) 
 
48% (29) 
27% (16) 
25% (15) 
Gender 
Female 
Male 
 
28% (13) 
72% (34) 
 
28% (6) 
72% (16) 
 
60% (36) 
40% (24) 
N 47 22 60 
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6.2	The	research	design	of	the	two	studies	with	the	cities	Las	Vegas	and	Los	
Angeles	
Both cities are presented in a photorealistic manner in the games. The visuals from 
both games were used unchanged, but the sound was substituted with an audio-guide 
for tourists in order to create a sightseeing experience. The audio-guide the 
“Hollywood Audio Tour” by he company Tourcaster was combined with the video-
game. In the studies, the participants were not given any information about the game 
itself, just the name of the city. 
 
For the Las Vegas study a between-group design was chosen and the participants 
were randomly assigned to two groups. For both groups the task was to take part in 
sightseeing in Las Vegas. The participants all listened to a guide and looked at the 
buildings along the Strip on a big screen. The sightseeing tour lasted seven minutes. 
For the first group a photo-mode setting was used. Photo-mode is similar to a 
recorded slideshow that present pictures one by on while the guide is talking about the 
buildings and the history of the city, the hotels and casinos. The other group had a 
similar presentation, but in motion-mode. The motion-mode is default for players of 
the game.  However, by comparing this to a photo-mode, a slideshow of pictures, the 
motion-effect can be revealed.  
 
For the Los Angeles-study the sightseeing was a live event in the sense that the visual 
of the game was used without any adaptation. The introduction was:  
“You are now going to do sightseeing in LA on the screen in front of you.” 
And, “I, the interviewer will be a co-guide and tell you when to move forward, 
when to stop and listen to the guide.  
 
All participants started on Vine Street with a view of the Capital Records Tower, and 
continued into Hollywood Boulevard. The virtual sightseeing tour lasted for 
approximately fifteen minutes. 
 
There are six measuring instruments that are commonly used in telepresence research. 
The purpose is to capture the subjective experience of the player (Nunez, 2007). 
These six instruments are; the Slater, Usoh and Steed (SUS) Questionnaire (1994), the 
Presence Questionnaire (PQ) (Witmer and Singer 1998), the Igroup Presence 
Questionnaire (IPQ) (Schubert et al., 2001), the Independent Television 
Commission’s Sense of Presence Inventory (Lessiter et al., 2001), the MEC Special 
Presence (MEC-SPQ, Vorderer et al. 2004), and Temple Presence Inventory (TPI) 
(Lombard et al., 2000; Lombard et al., 2011).  
 
For this study, the TPI was chosen because it contains the sub-construct named 
perceptual realism about the five senses; sight, smell, touch, sound and taste.  
 
We hypothesized, based on our theoretical discussion that it is when the senses are 
evoked that a telepresence experience occurs, or a stronger telepresence experience 
occurs. In order to study the correlation between activities and sensory feedback, the 
affordance concept was chosen. 
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6.2	The	Key	Findings	
First we report the mean scores, see Table 2. 	
Table 2 The Las Vegas and the Los Angeles studies and perceptual realism 
 Las Vegas  Las Vegas  Los Angeles  
 Sightseeing 
in photo-
mode 
Sightseeing in 
motion-mode 
Interactive 
sightseeing in 
game-mode 
 Mean Mean Mean 
Perceptual Realism, 7-point scale  
(1=fully disagree, 7=fully agree) 
Overall how much did touching the things and 
people in the city you saw feel like it would if you 
had experienced them directly? 
 
 
 
2.85 
 
 
 
3.40 
 
 
 
4.27 
How much did the heat or coolness (temperature) 
of the city you saw feel like it would if you had 
experienced it directly? 
 
2.74 
 
 
3.09 
 
3.23 
Overall, how much did the things and people in the 
city you saw smell like they would if you had 
experienced them directly? 
 
1.97 
 
2.54 
 
2.33 
Overall, how much did the things and people in the 
city you saw look like they would if you had 
experienced them directly? 
 
3.09 
 
3.97 
 
4.60 
Overall, how much did the things and people in the 
city you saw sound like they would if you had 
experienced them directly? 
 
2.62 
 
3.71 
 
3.60 
 
The higher scores for the motion mode indicate that moving pictures have a stronger 
telepresence effect on the participants than still photographs. This is in accordance 
with both theory and findings in other empirical studies (Yoon, Laffey and Oh, 2008; 
Ozok and Komlodi, 2009).  
 
For the Los Angeles study, all participants did an interactive sightseeing. With the 
exception of smell, it seems that, compared to the two alternatives, the interactive 
sightseeing experience evokes a stronger telepresence experience, that is, a higher 
score on four of five senses. We counted the number of participants that answered 
agree on the senses touch, look and sound, that is four on one of them and five or 
higher on the other two. We can describe those belonging to this group as “senses 
evoked”. A mean score around four can be interpreted as neither negative nor 
positive. In the Las Vegas study, in the motion-mode, 12 of the 35 participants 
reported a positive sense-reaction. In the Los Angeles study 18 of the 60 participants 
reported that the virtual sightseeing evoked a sense-reaction, see Table 3.  
 
Secondly, it is pertinent to ask how are the 18 (30%) that have the telepresence-
experience different from the 35 that did not report they had this feeling of being 
there? Mel Slater claims that humans have a propensity to find correlations between 
their activity and internal state and their sense perceptions. This is the key argument 
for the concept named correlational presence. Is there empirical evidence for this 
claim? Correlational presence and affordance are closely related. One of the purposes 
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of the empirical study was to use these concepts together with measurements from 
telepresence.  
 
Figure 2 shows a pattern. The findings indicate that the participants in the third group 
had a telepresence experience. The participants in the senses-not-evoked group were 
different. The numbers indicate that most participants in this group did not have a 
telepresence experience. 
 
Fig. 2 Affordances in a virtual environment 
 
7 Discussion 
In most cases the person that has the feeling of being there in a virtual place knows 
that a medium is involved. We do not discuss this question any further, but we agree 
with Floridi (2005) who argues that we should not define something as complex as 
presence by what it is not and by the failure of someone not to notice something.  
 
Many telepresence studies only report whether or not the feeling of being there is 
experienced in the moment or immediately after.	We designed a study with a 
sightseeing experience. We have documented that some of the participants reported 
that it was an experience of the place, a feeling of being in the actual city. The 
participants reported this immediately after the sightseeing had ended.  
 
Baruch Spinoza rejected the mind-body dualism of Descartes. One of his propositions 
concerns how we react and make judgment when receiving information. Heinemann 
(1941) with references to the empiricist school founded by Philinos of Kos in 
Alexandria distinguishes between three sorts of experiences. These are:  
 
immediate experience, mediated experience (that is observation made by 
others before us), and analogous experience (thus in case of illness which has 
not been observed it may be useful to compare similar cases). 
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Heinemann, in his discussion on types of experiences, refers J. A. H. Murray, the A 
New Dictionary on Historical Principles (Oxford, 1817). Murray distinguishes 
between to have an experience of, to learn by experience and to try something, a 
tentative experience. Regarding to have an experience, the first of these three 
Heinemann writes (1941: 570): 
 
(i) To have, experience of; to meet with; to feel; to suffer; to undergo. We 
could call this an immediate experience; it covers what we immediately feel or 
undergo during the course of our life.  
 
The immediate experience corresponds most often to how we use the word in this 
paper, and for instances in the phrase “an experience in a VE.” We emphasize the 
present tense, the experiencing. 
 
There can be many answers to the question why this feeling of being there occurs 
although the person knows that it is a media-induced experience. This question can be 
investigated with different lenses, and within an interdisciplinary context. In this 
paper we have drawn attention to some of the theories and ideas from phenomenology 
and philosophy, theories that can be used to reflect on what telepresence is and why it 
happens. And we have briefly discussed Merleau-Ponty and some of his thoughts and 
the Spinozian belief procedure. 
 
Experiences also include perceiving through the senses, as well as feeling and doing. 
Logue (2009) defines perceptual experience as experience associated with sense 
modalities (vision, hearing touch, smell and taste) in virtue of which it appears to one 
that one’s environment is a certain way. He emphasis is on the word of. He posits that 
a perceptual experience is a matter of a certain sort of relation obtaining between the 
subject of the experience and what the experience is of, that is the object of the 
experience. 
 
To design studies and investigate the interplay of the empirical and the philosophical 
is not an easy task. Technology plays a key role in our society and research that can 
contribute to theoretical discussion of experiences in which technology plays a key 
role should be encouraged. 	
The telepresence researcher Sheridan (1992) considers the extent of sensory 
information provided by media technology to be a mjor factor contributing to 
telepresence. According to Mingers (2001), the success of VR will depend on the 
extent to which it can mimic a response to all the nervous system’s sensory 
modalities. Not all will agree, but in the history of (console and PC) games, there are 
examples of games with simple graphics that can create a sense of presence. It is, 
however, pertinent to study the role of the senses with regard to telepresence and 
experiences in virtual environments. With video-games and video-game technologies, 
there are many opportunities for empirical studies, to test hypotheses about the role of 
the senses. 
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We have based our studies on virtual environments of cities from two video-games 
that are made by professional game-developers. The results from the two empirical 
studies indicate that the experience in the virtual environments evoked a bodily 
reaction for some of the participants, but not for all of them. The main contribution of 
this study is to draw attention to the need for a theoretical discussion about 
telepresence that includes phenomenology and theories of perception. For empirical 
work, we have given an example with the affordance concept and how sense-reactions 
can be measured in telepresence studies. 
 
McLuhan (1964) stated that media are extensions of the senses. Steuer (1992) had the 
vision that media technologies become more and more vivid. Thus, it is possible that 
we will, in the future, experience that systems will be capable to pass a version of the 
imitation game (Turing, 1950) that we can refer to as a “perceptual Turing test”. We 
are not there yet, but theories on the belief procedures, why a percept is believed, and 
the role of the body should be in our inquiries and analysis.  
  
The affordance concept can be operationalized and used in empirical studies. The 
development of decision theories is often based on empirical work. Insights from this 
field seem relevant for a discussion of the telepresence phenomenon. For future 
research, we should ask; are there good alternatives to the survey-based approach, that 
is, to ask the person to report to what extent the person has a telepresence experience? 
In addition to asking participants, that is, use introspective methods, we believe that 
electroencephalography (EEG), biosensors, and similar technology will play and role 
in telepresence research in the future. Such technologies are suitable to monitor sense-
reactions in the moment. There is already research along this path. An example is the 
neurophysiological study by Baumgarten et al. (2006) on electro-encephalography 
and spatial presence, a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) VR-study by 
Hoffman et al. (2003), and the study by Clemente et al. (2013) on telepresence and 
the activity of the right insula in the brain. This leads to an intricate question: how 
should we interpret this type of data without asking the person about the subjective 
experience?  
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